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INTRODUCTION
A man enters a hospital for a routine outpatient procedure. All appears
to go well, and the man is recovering at home with his wife and children
when he begins to feel ill. He returns to the hospital and discovers that he
has developed a post-operative infection because of unsterilized tools used
during the procedure. The improper sterilization did not result from
negligence on the part of a doctor or nurse but rather from the service and
maintenance of the equipment used in the sterilization process. The man,
a husband and a father, dies because of the infection. His family soon
learns that Louisiana jurisprudence may classify the family’s claim as one
of “malpractice,” sweeping it under the protections of the Louisiana
Medical Malpractice Act1 (“MMA”) and capping recovery at $500,000.2
The average person probably associates “malpractice” with a medical
professional erring in a professional capacity. Even scholars recognize that
“[t]he significance of the term ‘malpractice’ is that it is used to differentiate
Copyright 2017, by SARAH NICKEL.
1. See Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., 187 So. 3d 436 (La. 2015).
2. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (2017).
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professionals from nonprofessionals for purposes of applying certain statutory
limitations of tort liability.”3 The reality, however, is that medical professional
involvement is not a necessary element of “malpractice” under the MMA.4
When the Louisiana Legislature enacted the MMA, the Act gave certain
advantages to health care providers, including limiting recovery for victims.5
Because the Act is special legislation and deviates from the general rights of
tort victims by limiting a tort victim’s recovery, the Act’s coverage should be
construed strictly.6 In an effort to assist courts in determining whether an
injury constitutes “malpractice” under the MMA, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Coleman v. Deno set forth six factors.7 Unfortunately, those factors
have proven insufficient and unreliable as a test for malpractice as they are
overly broad and open to varying interpretations.8 In the hypothetical above,
one court may apply the factors to find coverage under the MMA while
another court, applying the same factors, may find general tort liability.9
Based on this determination between malpractice and general tort liability, the
victim either will be limited to $500,000 in damages or have no limit at all.10
In light of Louisiana’s public policy, which seeks to protect tort victims’
right to recovery and construe the MMA strictly, Louisiana courts should
adopt a new, narrower test for determining whether an act constitutes
“malpractice” under the MMA.
Part I of this Comment discusses the MMA’s enactment, including the
public policy concerns behind the Act, and details the advantages and
disadvantages it entails for both health care providers and tort victims. Part
II introduces Coleman, the source of the six-factor test, and argues that
these factors are an insufficient test for determining malpractice claims in
3. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 314–15 (La. 2002) (citing FRANK L.
MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 21–22 (1st ed.
1996)).
4. In Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C., the Court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that Dupuy’s injury was not treatment-related because the “maintenance
and service of sterilization equipment” was performed by “plant operations rather
than physicians.” Instead, the Court found that “[t]he use of the broad term ‘health
care provider,’ rather than simply ‘physician’ or ‘medical doctor,’ necessarily
includes actions which are treatment related and undertaken by the Hospital in its
capacity as a health care provider—even if those actions are not performed
directly by a medical professional.” Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 443.
5. See § 40:1231.2(B)(1).
6. Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 959 So. 2d 440, 444 (La. 2007).
7. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315.
8. See, e.g., LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 966 So. 2d 519
(La. 2007).
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. § 40:1231.2(B)(1).
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Louisiana. Part III discusses two Louisiana Supreme Court cases,
including the recent decision of Dupuy v. NMC Operating Company, as
examples of the unpredictability of the Coleman factors and of a court’s
tendency to apply these factors broadly, contrary to Louisiana’s public
policy on interpreting the MMA. Finally, Part IV recommends legislative
action to remedy the test for determining whether a certain claim
constitutes malpractice and proposes an alteration of the Coleman factors
as an interim solution for Louisiana courts.
I. THE ENACTMENT OF THE MMA: THE ACT’S
PROTECTIONS AND PURPOSES
The Louisiana Legislature enacted the MMA in 1975 in an effort to
“stabilize medical malpractice insurance rates and to assure the availability
of affordable medical services to the public.”11 The Legislature attempted
to accomplish these goals by reducing the number of medical malpractice
lawsuits being filed and damages being awarded.12 In furtherance of this
effort, the MMA provides certain advantages to qualified “health care
providers”13 in malpractice actions. First, the Act provides a statutory limit

11. Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. 1994).
12. Felicia Scroggins, Differentiating Medical Malpractice and Personal
Injury Claims in the Context of Statutory Protections: Lacoste v. Pendleton
Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 367, 367 (2008).
13. § 40:1231.1(A)(10) (defining “health care provider” as “a person,
partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
facility, or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or
professional services as a physician, hospital, nursing home, community blood
center, tissue bank, dentist, a licensed dietician or licensed nutritionist employed by,
referred by, or performing work under contract for, a health care provider or other
person already covered by this Part, registered or licensed practical nurse or certified
nurse assistant, offshore health service provider, ambulance service under
circumstances in which the provisions of R.S. 40:1237.1 are not applicable, certified
registered nurse anesthetist, nurse midwife, licensed midwife, nurse practitioner,
clinical nurse specialist, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical
therapist, occupational therapist, psychologist, social worker, licensed professional
counselor, licensed perfusionist, licensed respiratory therapist, licensed radiologic
technologist, licensed clinical laboratory scientist, or any nonprofit facility
considered tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, pursuant
to 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer or cancer-related
diseases, whether or not such a facility is required to be licensed by this state, or any
professional corporation a health care provider is authorized to form under the
provisions of Title 12 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, or any partnership,
limited liability partnership, limited liability company, management company, or
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to recovery of $500,000 “for all malpractice14 claims for injuries to or
death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits.”15
Second, it requires that malpractice claims filed against health care
providers covered by the MMA be reviewed by a medical review panel
before the suit may be brought in a court of law.16 The medical review
panel consists of three Louisiana-licensed health care providers and one
non-voting attorney chair-person.17 The purpose of the panel is “to express
its expert opinion as to whether or not the evidence supports the conclusion
that the defendant or defendants acted or failed to act within the
appropriate standards of care.”18 Once the panel issues its opinion, the
plaintiff chooses whether to file a lawsuit.19 If the case goes to trial and the
court determines that medical malpractice occurred, recovery still is
limited by the damages cap.20 These protections were enacted in response
corporation whose business is conducted principally by health care providers, or an
officer, employee, partner, member, shareholder, or agent thereof acting in the
course and scope of his employment”).
14. § 40:1231.1(A)(13) (defining “malpractice” as “any unintentional tort or
any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or
which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including
failure to render services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading
and unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a health
care provider arising from acts or omissions during the procurement of blood or
blood components, in the training or supervision of health care providers, or from
defects in blood, tissue, transplants, drugs, and medicines, or from defects in or
failures of prosthetic devices implanted in or used on or in the person of a
patient”). Subsection (A)(22) defines “tort” as:
[A]ny breach of duty or any negligent act or omission proximately
causing injury or damage to another. The standard of care required of
every health care provider, except a hospital, in rendering professional
services or health care to a patient, shall be to exercise that degree of skill
ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the members of his
profession in good standing in the same community or locality, and to
use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best judgment, in the
application of his skill.
§ 40:1231.1(A)(22).
15. Id. § 40:1231.2(B)(1).
16. Id. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a).
17. § 40:1231.8(C).
18. § 40:1231.8(G).
19. See Allison B. Lewis, Unreasonable and Imperfect: Constitutionality of
the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act’s Limit on Recovery, 69 LA. L. REV. 417,
420 (2009).
20. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (“The total amount recoverable for all malpractice
claims for injuries to or death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and
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to a perceived insurance crisis, but the Act, as well as the reasoning behind
its enactment, continue to be questioned.21
A. The Insurance Crisis
The Louisiana Legislature enacted the MMA in response to what many
of its proponents referred to as the “insurance crisis” of the 1970s.22
Nationally, malpractice insurance premiums were rising drastically as
commercial insurers withdrew from covering medical liability.23 In Louisiana
alone, four medical malpractice insurance companies abandoned the market,
leaving the state with only two providers.24 As a result, insurance premiums
increased by as much as 300% in Louisiana.25 Commentators blamed the
crisis on excessive damage awards and rising medical malpractice insurance
costs.26 Proponents of medical malpractice reform statutes, such as
Louisiana’s MMA, argued that large jury awards were causing insurance
premium increases.27 Others, however, believed that jury awards had
nothing to do with increases.28 Rather, actuaries believed the increases
were a result of normal actuarial cycles.29
Decades after the purported crisis, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal found in Whitnell v. Silverman that the Legislature enacted the
related benefits as provided in R.S. 40:1231.3, shall not exceed five hundred
thousand dollars plus interest and cost.”).
21. See Leonard J. Nelson et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three
Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69, 71 (2008); Lewis, supra note
19 (arguing the damages cap is unconstitutional); see also W. Taylor Hale, A
Critical Misdiagnosis: Re-Evaluating Louisiana’s Medical Malpractice, 53 LOY.
L. REV. 463 (2007) (arguing that the Act violates Equal Protection by not
affording every patient with an adequate remedy); Arrington v. ER Physicians
Group, AMPC, 940 So. 2d 777, 784 (La. Ct. App. 2006), vacated sub nom.
Arrington v. Galen-Med, Inc., 947 So. 2d 727 (La. 2007) (finding “the
$500,000.00 cap on medical malpractice damages unconstitutional as failing to
provide the plaintiffs an ‘adequate remedy’ as guaranteed under the provisions of
La. Const. art. 1, § 22”).
22. See Nelson et al., supra note 21, at 71.
23. Id. (discussing the 500% increase in premiums in some states).
24. Emily Townsend Black Grey, The Medical Malpractice Damages Cap:
What is Included?, 60 LA. L. REV. 547, 547 (2000).
25. Id.
26. See Lewis, supra note 19, at 418.
27. Id.
28. Whitnell v. Silverman, 646 So. 2d 989, 994 (La. Ct. App. 1994), rev’d,
686 So. 2d 823 (La. 1996).
29. Id.
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Act without the benefit of actuarial evidence specifically applicable to
Louisiana’s situation in 1975.30 In fact, the court found it likely that such
increases were part of the normal actuarial cycle and did not warrant
legislative action in 1975.31 This finding was based on testimony of
actuary Robert E. Lowe, who testified that the insurance industry
undergoes regular ten-year cycles.32 A so-called “crisis” occurs every ten
years because insurance companies purposefully underprice the premiums
in order to cause these “crises.”33 Lowe further testified that “[t]he
insurance industry likes to use the term ‘crisis’ because ‘they like to get
the sympathy of the consumer to support their efforts.’”34 Mr. Lowe
questioned the Legislature’s basis for enacting the MMA, stating that “in
1975 and prior thereto, medical malpractice insurance statistics were not
separately compiled or required to be separately reported to the Insurance
Commissioner’s Office. Thus there was no Louisiana medical malpractice
information available at the time that the statute was passed.”35 With critics
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The court discussed the testimony of actuary Robert Lowe:
We agree. Perhaps the best explanation is given by actuary Robert E.
Lowe. . . . Mr. Lowe testified that the insurance industry undergoes
regular 10 year cycles which include a ‘crisis’ every ten years. We have
had insurance crises in 1975, 1985, and are due one in 1995. These cycles
are well known in the literature and have been discussed by academic
writers and industry analysts for decades. The cycles are caused by
underpricing by the industry itself. In order to compete for the premium
dollar while still maintaining market share, insurance companies will
underprice premiums for a period of time. Because they are all
competing with each other for the same premium dollar and market
share, they will all underprice at the same time. Mismanagement of
pricing by the companies themselves creates a depletion of surplus, of
loss reserves, such that pricing must increase over a short period to make
up for the reserve depletion. As the pricing increases, it places strain on
the insurance companies to absorb business. There is a relationship
between the amount of business a company can write and the size of its
surplus. When the surplus is depleted, its capacity to write new business
decreases drastically. In order to add increasing prices in a short period
of time at a rapid rate, the insurance companies must dispose of some
business. Which business they dispose of is entirely within their control
and entirely arbitrary, but the companies dispose of the business which
they perceive to be more troublesome, such as medical malpractice and
environmental. This disposal of business is a commonly recognized
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questioning the reasoning behind the act’s enactment, scholars also began
questioning its constitutionality.36
B. The Constitutionality of the Act
Regardless of whether the Act’s enactment was justified from a policy
perspective, it has been subject to much constitutional scrutiny.37 As recently
as 2006, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Arrington v. ER
Physicians Group, APMC held the MMA’s damages cap unconstitutional
under the state constitution’s “adequate remedy” clause.38 The court reasoned
that the cap, enacted in 1975 and never adjusted for inflation, no longer
provided an injured patient with a sufficient remedy.39 When the Third Circuit
phenomenon in the insurance business and has been written about by
many industry commentators. The insurance companies dispose or dump
certain kinds of business by simply refusing to write certain lines. . . .
The insurance ‘crisis’ is never a crisis to the insurance companies, who
are in fact raising their rates rapidly.
Id.
36. See Lewis, supra note 19 (arguing the damages cap is unconstitutional);
see also Hale, supra note 21 (arguing that the Act violates Equal Protection by
not affording every patient with an adequate remedy); Arrington v. ER Physicians
Group, AMPC, 940 So. 2d 777, 784 (La. Ct. App. 2006), vacated sub nom.
Arrington v. Galen-Med, Inc., 947 So. 2d 727 (La. 2007) (holding “the $500,000
cap on medical malpractice damages unconstitutional as failing to provide the
plaintiffs an ‘adequate remedy’ as guaranteed under the provisions of La. Const.
art. 1, § 22”).
37. See Lewis, supra note 19 (arguing the damages cap is unconstitutional);
see also Hale, supra note 21 (arguing that the Act violates Equal Protection by
not affording every patient with an adequate remedy); see also Arrington, 940 So.
2d at 784 (holding “the $500,000 cap on medical malpractice damages
unconstitutional as failing to provide the plaintiffs an ‘adequate remedy’ as
guaranteed under the provisions of La. Const. art. 1, § 22.”).
38. Arrington, 940 So. 2d at 784; see also LA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“All courts
shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of
law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for
injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.”).
39. Arrington, 940 So. 2d at 781, in which the court discussed the
insufficiency of the cap:
The balance has been weighed heavily in favor of the health care
providers, their insurers, and The Patient’s Compensation Fund by the
two-thirds erosion in ‘‘the dollar’’ from 1975 to date which limits the
value of the claim to one-third if [sic] its value in 1975, thereby violating
the equal protection laws guaranteed by The Louisiana Constitution.
Id.
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adjusted the statutory $500,000 cap for inflation, that amount was only worth
$160,000.40 The court noted that it did not stand alone in finding a cap
unconstitutional, citing cases invalidating similar damages limitations in five
other states.41
Commentators have argued that the MMA’s cap on damages also
violates the Louisiana Constitution’s equal protection clause.42 The central
argument of these commentators is that the cap divides injured patients
into two categories: those who can receive an adequate remedy and those
who cannot.43 In fact, the more severe a victim’s injuries, the less likely
the victim is to recover fully.44 For instance, a man whose arm is broken
due to malpractice and who subsequently is awarded $10,000 by a jury
will recover his losses fully as determined by the jury. A man who is left
paralyzed due to malpractice and who is awarded $1 million by a jury,
however, will be able to recover only half of his award. The greater the
jury award exceeds the $500,000 cap, the more the injured patient
ultimately loses.45
Louisiana courts emphasize that, because the MMA limits tort liability
for qualified health care providers, it is “in derogation of the rights of tort
victims, and as such, the coverage of the [A]ct should be strictly
construed.”46 In addition, the MMA must be construed strictly when
considering the law’s questionable enactment purpose, its repeated
constitutional challenges, and its limitations on a tort victim’s ability to
recover damages fully.47 Despite the necessity of strict application, the
Coleman factors do not lead to strict construction of the MMA; rather, the
factors are easily manipulated.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE COLEMAN FACTORS
In 2002, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided six factors for courts
to consider when determining whether certain conduct by a qualified
40. Id.
41. Id. at 784 (citing cases finding medical malpractice caps unconstitutional
in Texas, Alabama, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Florida).
42. See Lewis, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
43. Lewis, supra note 19, at 425–28; Hale, supra note 21.
44. E.g., Taylor v. Clement, 940 So. 2d 796, 797 (La. Ct. App. 2006)
(discussing how the plaintiff’s award was initially an amount above $500,000, but
was reduced to the cap amount of $500,000).
45. Id.
46. See Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 959 So. 2d 440, 444 (La. 2007);
see also Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 1992).
47. See discussion supra Part I.
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health care provider constitutes malpractice as defined under the MMA.48
In Coleman v. Deno, a 32-year-old man alleged that “patient dumping”49
caused the defining delay that resulted in the need to amputate his arm to save
his life.50 Deciding whether this act of negligence, the alleged patient
dumping, constituted “malpractice,” the Court contemplated the meaning of
the MMA’s definition of “malpractice.”51 The MMA defines malpractice as
“any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or
professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a
health care provider, to a patient . . . .”52 The Act then defines a “tort” as
“any breach of duty or any negligent act or omission proximately causing
injury or damage to another.”53 Finally, “health care,” as used in the
definition of “malpractice,” is defined as “any act or treatment performed
or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any
health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s
medical care, treatment or confinement.”54 In addition to the legislative
definition of “malpractice,” the Court considered three factors previously
used in making malpractice determinations,55 as well as three additional
factors, thus providing the six factors now known as the Coleman factors.56
The first three factors originally were introduced in Sewell v. Doctors
Hospital, but were not conceived by the Court.57 Rather, the factors were
derived from an American Law Report (“ALR”).58 The first factor is
“whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or caused by a
dereliction of professional skill.”59 The second factor is “whether the
wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the
48. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002).
49. “Patient dumping” is the “refusal to treat patients with emergency medical
conditions who are uninsured and cannot pay for medical treatment or the transfer
of such patients to a public hospital.” Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Medical Found,
758 So. 2d 116, 117 n.1 (La. 2000).
50. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 307–10.
51. Id. at 314–15.
52. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.1(A)(13) (2017).
53. § 40:1231.1(A)(22).
54. § 40:1231.1(A)(9).
55. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315.
56. Id. at 316.
57. Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 579 n.3 (La. 1992).
58. Id. (quoting Holly P. Rockwell, Annotation, What Patient Claims Against
Doctor, Hospital, or Similar Health Care Provider Are Not Subject to Statutes
Specifically Governing Actions and Damages for Medical Malpractice, 89 A.L.R.4th
887 (1991)).
59. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315–16 (citing Sewell, 600 So. 2d at 579 n.3 (La.
1992)).
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appropriate standard of care was breached.”60 The third factor is “whether
the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient’s
condition.”61
The three additional factors came from a later version of the same
annotation,62 which make up the fourth, fifth, and sixth Coleman factors.
The fourth factor is “whether an incident occurred in the context of a
physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which
a hospital is licensed to perform.”63 The fifth factor is “whether the injury
would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment.”64 Lastly, the
sixth factor is “whether the tort alleged was intentional.”65
The ALR, from which the factors were derived, consists of annotations
on a variety of legal topics that generally are used by attorneys to learn
about an unfamiliar area of law quickly.66 These annotations are written
by attorneys across the country and include a full explanation of the topic
along with relevant cases from every jurisdiction.67 Thus, these factors,
adopted word-for-word from an annotation on medical malpractice, are
not tailored to Louisiana, its public policy concerns, or Louisiana’s
MMA.68 Instead, these factors are an accumulation of arguments made by

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 316.
63. Id. at 315–16.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, WESTLAW, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters
.com/law-products/westlaw-legal-research/litigator/alr [https://perma.cc/3MGSY8GY].
67. Id.
68. Rockwell, supra note 58 discusses courts’ various considerations when
defining the scope of medical malpractice statutes:
In defining the scope of the medical malpractice statutes as applied to
tort claims, the courts have weighed various considerations, including
the statutory language and legislative history, and the factual basis and
context of a claim. When focusing on statutory language, the courts have
tended to either define the breadth of coverage intended, as reflected in
general statutory terms or the legislative history, or to determine whether
a patient’s claim fell within the statutory definition of ‘treatment related,’
‘health care,’ ‘malpractice, error, or mistake,’ or like term, as a factual
matter. In analyzing the factual basis of a claim, the courts may consider
whether a particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or was caused by a
dereliction of professional skill or duty, whether the wrong can be
evaluated based on common knowledge or requires expert evidence to
determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached, or

2017]

COMMENT

321

courts across the country when determining whether a claim constitutes
malpractice under that particular state’s medical malpractice law.69
Because these factors are not tailored to Louisiana, each factor fails to
consider Louisiana’s public policy of protecting tort victims’ rights. The
factors also represent a national interpretation of what “malpractice”
means rather than the Louisiana Legislature’s intended definition of the
term. Thus, the arbitrary use of the ALR factors has resulted in
unpredictable malpractice determinations by Louisiana courts.
III. THE UNRELIABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE
NATURE OF THE COLEMAN FACTORS
Following Coleman, Louisiana courts continue to use the six factors
to evaluate whether a plaintiff’s claim constitutes malpractice under the
MMA.70 Because of the Legislature’s broad and elaborate definitions
within the MMA, courts likely viewed the Coleman factors as a simpler,
more efficient test. But an enumerated list is not better than a structured,
published definition—especially when that list is not tailored to Louisiana
and is as broad as the text of the MMA. In light of the factors’ foundation,
it is no surprise that their application has been unsuccessful in Louisiana.
Because of the broad wording, there are instances when Louisiana courts
have majority and dissenting opinions that apply the same six factors and
reach different conclusions.71 For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court
did just that in LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hospital, L.L.C.
A. LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hospital, L.L.C.
LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hospital involved a claim by a
patient’s surviving family members after the patient, who was on life
support at Pendleton Methodist Hospital, died during a power outage

whether the act at issue involved assessment of the patient's condition.
In addition, courts have considered factors such as whether an incident
occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within
the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform, whether
the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment,
and whether the tort alleged was intentional.
Id.
69. Id.
70. E.g., LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 966 So. 2d 519, 524–25
(La. 2007).
71. See, e.g., id.; see also Billeaudeau v. Opelouses Gen. Hosp. Auth., 189 So.
3d 562 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
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following Hurricane Katrina.72 Chief Justice Calogero began his opinion
by reiterating that the MMA “applie[s] only and strictly to cases of medical
malpractice . . . because the [MMA] limitations on such liability were
created by special legislation in derogation of the general rights of
Louisiana tort victims.”73 After establishing that the hospital was a
“qualified health care provider,” the Court proceeded to apply the
Coleman factors, ultimately concluding that the claims against the hospital
did not constitute malpractice but fell under general negligence.74 In
reversing the court of appeals’ holding that these claims were malpractice
under the MMA, the Court reiterated that the MMA limitations apply
strictly to claims arising from medical malpractice.75 Thus, the claim did
not have to be presented to a medical review panel, and the plaintiffs’ relief
was not subject to the $500,000 cap.76 Justice Weimer agreed with Justice
Knoll’s dissent, which applied the Coleman factors more broadly to reach
the opposite conclusion.77
In LaCoste, the plaintiffs alleged negligent and intentional acts by the
defendant in
designing, constructing and/or maintaining a facility in such a
manner that the hospital did not have sufficient emergency power
to sustain life support systems . . . by designing, constructing
and/or maintaining a facility in such a manner that allowed flood
waters to enter the structure, thus endangering the safety of the
patients . . . failure to implement an adequate evacuation plan . . .
failure to have a facility available for transfer of patients . . . failure
72. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 521.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 519.
75. Id. at 524. The court discussed Louisiana’s public policy interest in
avoiding derogation of tort victims’ rights:
This court has steadfastly emphasized that the [MMA] and its limitations on
tort liability for a qualified health care provider apply only to claims ‘arising
from medical malpractice,’ and that all other tort liability on the part of a
qualified health care provider is governed by general tort law. . . . This is so
because, as we have oft repeated, the [MMA’s] limitations on the liability of
health care providers were created by special legislation in derogation of the
rights of tort victims. . . . In keeping with this concept, any ambiguity should
be resolved in favor of the plaintiff and against finding that the tort alleged
sounds in medical malpractice. The limitations of the [MMA], therefore,
apply strictly to cases of malpractice as defined by the [MMA].
Id.
76. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) (2017); see also id. § 40:1231.2(B)(1).
77. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 530.
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to have in place a plan to transfer patients in the event of mandatory
evacuation.78
Evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court interpreted each Coleman
factor in favor of general tort liability, enabling the plaintiffs to file their
claim in a court of law immediately without being subject to a medical
review panel.
Regarding the first factor, “whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment
related’ or caused by a dereliction of professional skill,”79 the Court rejected
the appellate court’s reasoning that “the lack of sufficient back-up power is
akin to a failure to have adequate equipment and, thus, a failure to provide
medical treatment.”80 Instead, the majority found that the allegations did not
relate to “medicine, medical care, or medical treatment.”81 The Court
reasoned that the language used, such as “designing,” “constructing,” and
“maintaining,” all suggested issues of premises liability or general
negligence but not a dereliction of a professional medical skill.82
Conversely, Justice Knoll’s dissent argued that “[b]ecause the wrong
alleged is the failure to provide the proper ventilation care . . . the allegations
do relate to the patient’s treatment and an alleged dereliction of the
professional skill.”83 In her opinion, it was “overly simplistic” to find that
the plaintiffs rested their allegations on the power failure alone.84 She argued
that it was improper to restrict the application of the factor to the lack of
power.85 She instead thought it was appropriate to extend the application to
the result of what the lack of electricity caused—the failure to provide
treatment.86
In addressing the second factor, “whether the wrong requires expert
medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care
was breached,”87 the Court found that, although the details of a hospital
emergency evacuation plan may call for expert medical evidence in some
scenarios, the allegations at hand did not require such expert medical
evidence.88 The claims simply did not contain any allegations against

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 521.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002).
LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 526.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 530 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
Id. at 531.
Id.
Id.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002).
LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 527.
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“individuals with medical training, such as doctors and nurses, who failed
to exercise proper medical skills or procedures.”89
Justice Knoll, however, found much significance in the uniqueness of
health care emergency preparedness.90 She argued that, because of the
specialized nature of a hospital emergency plan, medical experts likely
would be necessary to determine the appropriate standard of care in
implementing the particular emergency plan.91 She also argued that “only
physicians can issue transfer and acceptance orders, and negligence
regarding transfer decisions and planning in evacuations likely cannot be
established without expert medical testimony.”92
In analyzing the third factor, “whether the pertinent act or omission
involved assessment of the patient’s condition,”93 the Court recognized the
defendant’s argument that “the failure-to-evacuate contention and the
failure-to-transfer contention [were] simply other ways of saying that the
hospital was negligent in admitting and treating [Mrs. LaCoste].”94 The
Court found this argument unconvincing and determined that the
plaintiffs’ petition did not make a “failure to treat” allegation.95 Based on
the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court concluded that “determin[ing] whether
sufficient emergency power would be available or an evacuation plan
should be implemented” did not require the assessment of Mrs. LaCoste’s
condition.96
Once again, Justice Knoll viewed the application of the factors
differently. She found that, despite the wording of the allegations, “the
alleged wrongdoing inherently involved a medical assessment and
evaluation of Mrs. LaCoste’s condition.”97 Justice Knoll discussed how
decisions regarding transportation of patients “necessarily includes an
assessment of the patient’s condition.”98 In her broad interpretation of the
allegations, Justice Knoll expanded the plaintiffs’ claims to include
allegations that were not made.99 The issues at hand dealt with the building
itself and the hospital’s preparedness.100 Mrs. LaCoste’s ventilator stopped
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 531 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002).
LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 527.
Id. at 527–28.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 531–32 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
Id. at 532.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 521 (majority opinion).
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running because power was lost and the hospital’s emergency plans were
insufficient.101 Plaintiffs did not make allegations against a doctor who
failed to transfer Mrs. LaCoste.102
Regarding the fourth factor, “whether an incident occurred in the
context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of
activities which a hospital is licensed to perform,”103 the hospital asserted
that “attempting to preserve the life of a patient is an activity that a hospital
is exclusively licensed to perform.”104 The Court disagreed as “there [was]
no allegation in the petition that a medical decision by any physician or
nurse resulted in the failure to transfer this patient and that such failure
resulted in her death.”105 The Court concluded that the claims alleged did
not involve a physician-patient relationship.106
Justice Knoll, against the majority’s repeated warnings to avoid
applying the factors so broadly, continued to look beyond the actual
claims.107 Instead of looking at the allegations of the plaintiffs, she
expanded them into “failure to transport” and “failure to provide
treatment.”108 By transforming these allegations, she was able to argue that
“[p]hysicians are exclusively licensed” to make decisions regarding
transfers and that “[i]t is the failure of the treatment and care for which the
hospital was licensed to perform that is at issue in this case and weighs
this factor in favor the defendant's position.”109
When analyzing the fifth factor, “whether the injury would have
occurred if the patient had not sought treatment,”110 the Court recognized
the difficulty in evaluating the factor because “any wrong that a patient
suffers in a hospital or doctor’s office would not occur if the patient had
not first entered the facility.”111 Instead of using this type of “but-for”
rationale, the Court applied this factor in relation to its determination of
the other Coleman factors. The Court reasoned that, because it found the
allegations were not treatment-related, it could not interpret this factor
reasonably in favor of malpractice.112 Conversely, Justice Knoll did apply
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 316 (La. 2002).
LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 528.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 532 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 316 (La. 2002).
LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 528–29.
Id. at 529.
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a “but-for” rationale and found that “[i]f Mrs. LaCoste had not been taken
to the hospital for treatment of pneumonia and placement on a ventilator,
she would not have been subject to the alleged failure of lifesaving
care.”113
The sixth factor, “whether the tort alleged was intentional,”114 proved to
be of no significance in this case. The majority and Justice Knoll agreed that
the sixth factor was irrelevant considering that there was no allegation of
intentional wrongdoing.115
LaCoste is a prime example of the uncertainty and unreliability of the
Coleman factors. The same Court, analyzing the same set of facts, applied
each factor to reach wholly contradictory conclusions. Though the majority
applied the factors narrowly, in accordance with public policy, the dissent
applied them broadly to find “malpractice” under the MMA. Furthermore, the
LaCoste decision is not unique in its conflicting analysis.116 Often, a majority
applying the Coleman factors narrowly wrestles with a dissent undermining its
entire argument with a broad application.117 Still, other cases involve no dissent
and, instead, a broad application of the factors prevails.118 This broad
application, as exemplified in Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C., is contrary
to Louisiana’s public policy and demonstrates the need for a new malpractice
test. In fact, even without a dissent exposing the flaws of such an application,
the factors’ glaring unreliability still shines through.
B. Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C.
In March 2016, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Dupuy v. NMC
Operating Co., L.L.C., which proved to be an example of a broad application
of the Coleman factors.119 A patient of the Spine Hospital of Louisiana,
Richard Dupuy, allegedly developed a post-operative infection following
spine surgery.120 Dupuy claimed that the hospital had failed to “properly
maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical

113. Id. at 532 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
114. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 316.
115. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 529.
116. See, e.g., Billeaudeau v. Opelouses Gen. Hosp. Auth., 189 So. 3d 562 (La.
Ct. App. 2016).
117. See, e.g., id.
118. See, e.g., Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., 187 So. 3d 436 (La. 2016).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 437.
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instruments.”121 The hospital filed a dilatory exception of prematurity,122
arguing that the claim fell under the MMA and thus first needed to be heard
by a medical review panel.123
The district court disagreed with the hospital, finding that the claim
should be governed by general tort liability.124 Following the First Circuit
Court of Appeal’s denial of the hospital’s writ, the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted the writ and reversed the trial court’s decision.125 After establishing
that the hospital was a “qualified health care provider” as required by the
MMA, the Court applied each Coleman factor and concluded that the
plaintiffs’ allegation of improper maintenance constituted medical
malpractice under the MMA.126
Analyzing the first Coleman factor, the Court determined Dupuy’s claim
was “treatment related.”127 The Court cited cases in which “infectious diseases
acquired during surgical procedures [were considered] ‘treatment related.’”128
The Court found that a hospital’s “alleged failure to ‘properly maintain and
service all equipment used in the sterilization process’ is an extension of the
general duty to render professional services related to medical treatment and
is ‘treatment related.’”129 The claims of the Dupuy case and those cases cited
are distinguishable, however. Unlike the cases cited by the Court,130 Dupuy’s
claim was not of negligence on behalf of the doctor or nurses in failing to
sterilize equipment; rather, Dupuy’s claim concerned the hospital’s failure to
properly maintain and service sterilization equipment.131
Failing to maintain and service hospital equipment has been found in
other cases not to be “treatment related” but to fall under general tort
liability.132 Thus, Dupuy’s claim of failure to maintain and service

121. Id. at 436–37.
122. In Louisiana, the dilatory exception is a means of defense aimed at
retarding the progress of an action. A dilatory exception of prematurity may be
brought by a defendant when the action is filed too early. LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 921, 923, 926 (2017).
123. Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 437–38.
124. Id. at 438.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315–16 (La. 2002).
128. Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 440.
129. Id. at 441.
130. See Cashio v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 378 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App.
1979); see also McBride v. Earl K. Long Mem’l Hosp., 507 So. 2d 821 (La. 1987).
131. Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 438.
132. See Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 959 So. 2d 440, 446 (La. 2007);
see also Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 888 So. 2d 782, 789–90 (La.
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sterilization equipment should have resulted in tort liability, as it was more
aligned with cases like Blevins v. Hamilton Medical Center and Williamson
v. Hospital Service District No. 1.133 Those cases involved allegations of
failing to maintain and repair equipment properly within the hospital, namely
a hospital bed and a wheelchair.134 Finding that such maintenance and repair
were not related directly to actual treatment of the patient, the Court concluded
in both cases that those actions could not be considered malpractice.135
In Blevins, the Court found that poor maintenance of the hospital bed,
which resulted in a knee injury, was completely distinct from the treatment
the patient received for his infection.136 Similarly, the failure to maintain the
sterilization equipment was distinct from Dupuy’s surgery. Such maintenance
occurred before Dupuy ever entered the hospital and could have affected any
other patient receiving care at the hospital. In Dupuy, the Court ignored the
substance of the plaintiff’s claim and instead looked at the injury—an
infection—to align the case with other jurisprudence.137
A Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal case, Cashio v. Baton Rouge
General Hospital, arguably supports the majority’s opinion in Dupuy.138 In
Cashio, the court held that “treatment” includes “the furnishing of a clean and

2004); LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 966 So. 2d 519, 525 (La.
2007).
133. Blevins, 959 So. 2d 440; see also Williamson, 888 So. 2d 782.
134. Blevins, 959 So. 2d 440; Williamson, 888 So. 2d 782.
135. See Blevins, 959 So. 2d at 444; see also Williamson, 888 So. 2d at 790–91.
136. Blevins, 959 So. 2d at 446.
137. See Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., 187 So. 3d 436, 445 (La. 2015). By
the end of the opinion, the court concluded that “the plaintiff’s allegations
regarding failure to sterilize the equipment used to sanitize surgical instruments
fall under the MMA.” Id. This wording is a clear alteration of the plaintiff’s claim.
This type of alteration is exactly what the LaCoste Court cautioned against:
[P]laintiffs do not allege a “failure to transfer,” but rather, they allege
that the defendant failed to implement an adequate evacuation plan,
failed to have in place a plan to transfer patients in the event of a
mandatory evacuation, and failed to have a facility available for the
transfer of patients. While a failure to transfer may relate to medical
malpractice in another case, [the claims alleged here are] not “treatment
related” or the result of the dereliction of professional medical skill,
based on the factual allegations to which our review is limited. . . . As
we cautioned in Williamson, “[a]n expansive reading of the definition of
medical malpractice contained in the MMA runs counter to our previous
holdings that coverage of the Medical Malpractice Act should be strictly
construed.”
LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 526.
138. Cashio v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 378 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
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sterile environment for all patients.”139 The Dupuy Court found that “proper
sterilization of surgical instruments is at the very core of the ‘treatment’ of a
patient.”140 The problem with this comparison, however, is that Dupuy’s
claim is not one of proper sterilization but one of proper maintenance and
service of hospital equipment.141
Regarding “whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to
determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached,”142 the
Dupuy Court concluded that expert medical testimony was necessary because
“whether instruments were in fact properly sterilized is a question that
requires medical expertise.”143 Again, the Court focused on sterilization,
providing an example of a medical expert being needed to explain the protocol
of such maintenance.144 The issue, however, was not simply whether the
equipment was sterilized; rather, Dupuy’s claim was for failure to maintain
and service sterilization equipment.145
The Court in Williamson recognized that expert testimony may be
required to establish the duty to maintain a wheelchair and the breach of that
duty.146 The Court, however, found that such evidence need not be medical.147
Expert testimony is not the same as expert medical testimony. Thus, Dupuy is
more aligned with Williamson in the respect that although expert evidence
may be put forth, that evidence need not be supplied by a medical expert. The
plaintiffs in Dupuy alleged that the service and maintenance was done by
“plant operations.”148 No expert medical evidence would be necessary to
establish the proper standard of care in maintaining and servicing the
sterilization equipment.
The Court did not address the third factor, “whether the pertinent act or
omission involved assessment of the patient’s condition,” or the sixth factor,
“whether the tort alleged was intentional.”149 Instead, it briefly mentioned in
a footnote that it would not address these factors because the “parties agree
that factors three and six do not have relevance in this case.”150 This decision
by the Court is confusing because the maintenance and service of sterilization
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 184.
Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 442.
Id. at 436–37.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315–16 (La. 2002).
Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 443.
Id.
Id. at 436–37.
Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 888 So. 2d 782, 790 (La. 2004).
Id.
Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 443.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315–16 (La. 2002).
Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 444 n.10.
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equipment did not involve the assessment of the patient’s condition in any
way. Thus, the third factor likely would have favored the plaintiffs in this case.
The Court next addressed the fourth factor, “whether an incident occurred
in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of
activities which a hospital is licensed to perform.”151 The Court discussed the
Hospital Licensing Law, enacted in 1961, which “directed the Department of
Health and Hospitals to adopt ‘rules, regulations, and minimum standards’
that must be met by every licensed hospital.”152 Among the standards listed
are those relating to “sanitary conditions, practices and environment and
sanitary and sterilization procedures and practices designed to avoid sources
and transmission of infections, including regulations governing the isolation
of patients with communicable diseases.”153 The Court found that this statute
required hospitals to have clearly established sterilization procedures to
maintain operating licenses.154 The problem with this finding is that Dupuy’s
claim was not an allegation of improper hospital procedures, nor was it an
allegation of improper adherence to the hospital’s procedure. The allegation
was that, despite having a procedure in place for properly sterilizing
equipment and following that procedure, the hospital failed to service and
maintain that equipment properly.
In a footnote, the Court found that, although the parties to the suit argued
about the second element of the factor, the incident also “occurred in the
context of a physician-patient relationship.”155 Because the exact source of
Dupuy’s infection had not yet been determined, the Court found that the
“incident” that caused the infection was ultimately the surgery itself,
regardless of the origin of the initial source.156 The “incident,” however, which
is the subject of the claim, was the maintenance and service failure.157 The
first element of this factor likely was not discussed by either party because it
did not seem plausible that the service and maintenance of sterilization
equipment would be considered within the context of a physician-patient
relationship because those actions occur before a patient even enters a
hospital.
In analyzing the fifth factor, “whether the injury would have occurred if
the patient had not sought treatment,”158 the Court found this factor clearly
favored the hospital because Dupuy’s injury occurred during the treatment
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315–16.
Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 444 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 40:2109 (2017)).
§ 40:2109(B)(2).
Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 444.
Id. at 444 n.11.
Id.
Id. at 436–37.
Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315–16 (La. 2002).

2017]

COMMENT

331

period.159 Similarly to Justice Knoll’s dissent in LaCoste,160 the Court applied
a “but-for” standard that would be difficult to overcome on any set of facts—
of course a patient will not suffer the injury if he never seeks treatment at the
hospital. Therefore, using a “but-for” standard always will favor the plaintiff.
Consequently, with all factors leaning in favor of “malpractice,” the Court
held that Dupuy’s claim fell within the scope of the MMA.161
The Coleman factors’ susceptibility to dissimilar applications of similar
facts demonstrates their unpredictable and unreliable nature. Factors used to
determine malpractice should result only in a narrow application of the MMA
consistent with Louisiana’s public policy concern for tort victims’ ability to
recover. The commonly used Coleman factors provide an insufficient means
of determining whether claims constitute malpractice under the MMA.
Recognizing their insufficiency, several Louisiana courts have chosen not to
apply the factors in post-Coleman decisions.162 Thus, in light of these apparent
issues of inconsistency in applying the law and veering away from established
public policy, a solution to this problem is necessary.
IV. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CURE
Because of Louisiana’s concern with denying tort victims full
recovery,163 the Louisiana Legislature should provide courts with a reliable
test for determining whether a claim constitutes malpractice under the MMA.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court attempted to solidify the malpractice
analysis by implementing the Coleman factors, that attempt was in vain. As a
statutorily governed area of law, defining “malpractice” entails much more
than establishing an easy-to-apply test. To prevent divergent opinions, courts
need more than broad definitions for guidance when dealing with complicated
and specific facts. The Legislature should provide Louisiana courts with a
narrow definition of malpractice that construes the MMA strictly. This
definition should explain clearly what claims constitute malpractice so that
Louisiana courts can make these determinations with consistency.
As an intermediate solution, Louisiana courts deciding malpractice
claims should apply an altered version of the current Coleman factors that
emphasizes a narrow application. The first Coleman factor should be altered
159. Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 445.
160. LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., 966 So. 2d 519, 532 (La. 2007)
(Knoll, J., dissenting).
161. Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 440–45.
162. See, e.g., Gayden v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 891 So.
2d 734 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
163. See Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 959 So. 2d 440, 444 (La. 2007);
see also Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577 (La. 1992).
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from “whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or caused by a
dereliction of professional skill”164 to “whether the particular wrong alleged
is related to the treatment the patient received or caused by a dereliction of
professional skill.” Including the word “alleged” will steer the courts toward
focusing on the actual allegations before them. Modifying a plaintiff’s
allegations, as was done in Dupuy and in Justice Knoll’s LaCoste dissent,165
is not the duty of the courts. Rather, courts must focus on the language of the
plaintiff’s allegations, and to not do so is insupportable.166 Moreover,
amending the phrase “treatment related” to “related to the treatment that
patient received” will help the court focus on the particular patient’s actual
treatment rather than going down the chain of causation as Justice Knoll did
in LaCoste.167
The second Coleman factor should be amended from “whether the wrong
requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate
standard of care was breached”168 to “whether the wrong alleged requires
expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care
was breached.” Again, incorporating “alleged” will help the courts focus on
the actual claim presented. This change will aid in preventing scenarios
similar to that of LaCoste, in which Justice Knoll discussed the need for expert
medical evidence in determining the standard of care for transferring patients
when “failure to transfer” was not the plaintiff’s claim.169 Further, placing
emphasis on the medical nature of expert testimony will remind the court that
a medical expert, rather than any individual employed by a hospital, must be
required.170
The third factor, “whether the pertinent act or omission involved
assessment of the patient’s condition,”171 should be amended to “whether the
alleged act or omission occurred as part of the assessment of the patient’s
condition.” Once again, replacing “pertinent” with “alleged” will help the
court focus on the actual claim in the case. Additionally, substituting
“involved” with “occurred as part of” stresses that the “act or omission” needs
to be part of assessing the patient—not merely somehow involved in the
eventual care of the patient.

164. See Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 315–16 (La. 2002).
165. See discussion supra Part III.
166. See discussion supra Part III.A.
167. See discussion supra Part III.A.
168. See Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315–16.
169. LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., 966 So. 2d 519, 531 (La. 2007)
(Knoll, J., dissenting).
170. See discussion supra Part III.B.
171. See Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315–16.
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The fourth factor, “whether an incident occurred in the context of a
physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a
hospital is licensed to perform,”172 should be modified to read “whether the
alleged incident occurred in the context of the physician-patient relationship,
or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform.”
Inserting “alleged” ensures yet again that the court’s focus remains on the
actual claim at hand.
The fifth factor, “whether the injury would have occurred if the patient
had not sought treatment,”173 should be removed altogether. As the Court has
discussed, this factor suggests a “but-for” analysis that almost always will be
satisfied.174 If a patient suffers an injury in a hospital, it is likely that the patient
would not have suffered the injury if he had never entered the hospital. The
unreliability of this fifth factor was made clear in LaCoste.175 As the majority
indicated, there are very few scenarios in which a patient could suffer an injury
in a hospital that would have occurred even if he had not sought treatment
there.176 The only exception to this factor leaning in favor of malpractice
established by jurisprudence is when the injury could have occurred to a
visitor of the hospital.177 In that scenario, however, the previous four factors
would lead to the conclusion of general tort liability considering the victim
was not a patient of the hospital.
Similarly, the sixth factor, “whether the tort alleged was intentional,”178
also should be removed because it carries no weight, considering the MMA’s

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 529; see also Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. of
Jefferson, 888 So. 2d 782, 791 (La. 2004) (discussing “a ‘but for’ rationale that
may be overly facile”).
175. See discussion supra Part III.A.
176. LaCoste, 966 So. 2d at 528–29; see also Williamson, 888 So. 2d at 791
(discussing “a ‘but for’ rationale that may be overly facile”).
177. Williamson, 888 So. 2d at 791, where the Court discussed the
impracticability of a but-for standard in this context:
This factor initially weighs to some extent in favor of the defendant,
because the plaintiff likely would not have been transported in the
wheelchair had she not sought treatment at the hospital. Such reasoning,
however, employs a ‘but for’ rationale that may be overly facile. It is just
as reasonable to say that any visitor to the hospital, even those not
seeking treatment, who used this particular wheelchair could have
suffered injury.
Id.
178. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315–16 (citing Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So.
2d 577, 579 n.3 (La. 1992)).
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definition of malpractice begins with “any unintentional tort.”179 When
determining whether the MMA applies, the analysis begins with the definitions
established within the MMA. As the Court found in both LaCoste and Dupuy,
these factors simply provide assistance in determining malpractice,180 making
this factor wholly unnecessary.181
Use of these altered Coleman factors by Louisiana courts provides a
starting point, but ultimately the Legislature should amend the MMA to
provide a clearer definition of malpractice that is aligned with the state’s
public policy concerns for avoiding derogation of tort victims’ rights.
Additionally, incorporating the above-amended factors into the MMA may
assist the Legislature in achieving that objective.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana courts have applied these non-Louisiana based, broad,
unreliable factors with little consistency since 2002. When addressing the vital
public policy concern with limiting tort victims’ right to recovery, Louisiana
courts should have a straightforward, Louisiana-based approach to making
malpractice determinations. The Coleman factors, though sometimes applied
with Louisiana’s public policy in mind, are susceptible to varying
interpretations. This susceptibility shows that the Coleman factors are an
insufficient test that fails to accomplish the public policy goals of Louisiana
under the MMA.
The ideal solution is to amend Louisiana’s MMA to provide a clearer
definition of “malpractice” so courts will achieve non-conflicting results.
Considering courts’ familiarity with the Coleman factors, an alteration of
those factors that emphasizes construing the MMA strictly would be a simple
and efficient starting point.
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